Hundreds of problems continue to plague the troubled Joint Strike Fighter, potentially calling into question the basic performance and reliability of the costliest weapons program in U.S. history, the Defense Department's inspector general charges in a new report.In a 16-month investigation that began in February 2012, the inspector general's office — an agency within the Pentagon responsible for investigating allegations of waste, fraud, security lapses and other misconduct — identified more than 360 quality "issues" with the F-35 Lightning II — with 147 of them classified as "major."http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/01/20777728-watchdog...Sure, the F-35 program was started under George W. Bush, but it's Obama's baby now. He cannot duck responsibility for the overwhelming number of flaws in the program. After five years why doesn't Obama have the F-35 flying high and true?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-35_Lightning_...Even more importantly, the disastrous development history of the F-35 Strike Fighter (and many prior weapons systems) raises serious questions about the appropriateness of government involvement in the nation's defense.Rabit
I think they should fire the head of the DOD responsible for the F-35 at the very minimum.
I agree. The F-35 is not needed and is a waste of taxpayer money.Get rid of it and significantly reduce the size of our military - especially perm bases in Europe.What else you got?
What else you got?Hawkwin, I have the strong sense that you and I working together could sort the federal government out in short order.Peter
I agree. The F-35 is not needed and is a waste of taxpayer money.Get rid of it and significantly reduce the size of our military - especially perm bases in Europe.____________Can we cut bases in Asia as well? If a program isn't working, then scrap it. Isn't that the biggest problem with Washington, nobody scraps bad programs whether it's a fighter jet the military didn't even ask for or a health plan that's making the system worse. Maybe it's foriegn aid to a Country that doesn't need or deserve it. That's why I think all spending programs should come with an expiration date no greater than 10 years out. It would force Congress to re-examine the programs instead of just feeding the beast.
The F-35 is not needed and is a waste of taxpayer money.I think you got that half right. It has turned out to be a collossal waste of the taxpayer money. But, unfortunately, it will be needed. Aging Harriers, F-18s, and F-16s need to be replaced. And it is almost certainly more cost effective to fix issues with the F-35 than to start from scratch. But the experiment of saving money by creating one platform to serve all needs appears to have failed.
You have it spot on. The platform was designed to do too much. That plus Lockheed Martin promising the moon gets you cost overruns.
jdp But the experiment of saving money by creating one platform to serve all needs appears to have failed. As if the experiment had not already been performed.The F-111 originated in studies for a replacement for Tactical Air Command's F-100 Super Sabres and F-105 Thunderchiefs in the tactical strike role. Tactical Air Command wanted an aircraft which could operate from shorter runways. They also required a longer ferry range as overseas deployments by F-100s were often limited by refuelling problems. The aircraft would also be optimized for very low-level penetration, including a final 370 km dash at Mach 1.2. It would be a multi-role aircraft, capable of Mach 2.5 at high level in the interceptor role. This made it inevitable that the successful design would have a variable geometry, swing wing. Glueing on the fighter role and the demand for Mach 2.5 capability immediately made the F-111 designers jobs more difficult. Their task, however, would soon be immeasurably complicated by the incoming Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. He directed that the USAF (whose primary requirement was still for a low-level strike aircraft) and the US Navy (who need a long-range carrierborne interceptor) should acquire a common aircraft. This became known by the acronym TFX. Both services initially welcomed the joint common fighter, until it became clear that no single airframe could meet all the different requirements. By then, however, the bit was between McNamara's teeth, and he drove the program forward. Boeing and General Dynamics competed for the lucrative TFX contract, which was awarded to the latter company (the military favored the Boeing submission) in November 1962. The General Dynamics design was more of a compromise, and the US Navy and USAF versions were variants of a common airframe. The Boeing aircraft, however, was tailored more closely to the USAF requirement, while the Boeing Navy version had relatively little commonality with the USAF variant. McNamara was later accused of having bought the second best airplane at the higher price. Technical difficulties, barely controlled weight growth and massive cost escalation characterized the remainder of the TFX's development. During wind-tunnel testing severe drag problems were encountered. Weight reduction programs on the naval version reduced commonality to a mere 28 per cent or so, before the F-111B altogether, and replaced by the F-14 Tomcat.http://www.military-today.com/aircraft/f_111_aardvark.htmPeter
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